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On the 20th of February, a 38-year old man from Codogno, a small town in the Lombardia 
region of Italy, was the first in the country to officially test positive for COVID19. In the 
weeks that followed, the country’s epidemic has grown exponentially, recording the highest 
European number of cases and the highest numbers of deaths after China. On the 16th of 
March 2020, recorded cases reached 27,980 and 2,158 deaths. On the 8th of March the Italian 
government began introducing a series of emergency measures, initially locking down a 
number of particularly affected “red zones” in the Northern regions. The ‘lockdown’ was 
then quickly extended to the rest of Italy, putting in place restrictions on movement between 
‘comuni’, that is local municipal areas, and encouraging people to stay home. On the 11th of 
March a further decree required the closure until at least the 25th of March of all restaurants, 
bars and all shops excluding groceries and pharmacies. Punitive measures in the form of fines 
or potential jail terms up to three months are in place to regulate violation of the decrees. 
While some have defined such measures as draconian, the Italian government has deemed 
them necessary to halt the spread of an epidemic, which is rapidly depleting the national 
health system’s capacity.  
 
It is increasingly recognised that, when organising outbreak responses, there is a need to also 
take into account the social, political and economic dimensions of epidemics (Bardosh et al. 
2019; Abramowitz 2017; Sams and Desclaux 2017). This includes an understanding of how 
socio-cultural dynamics affect transmission, the circulation of information, and the ability to 
put in place effective responses. Such dynamics differ across social and geographical 
contexts because social practices, political economies and historical trajectories have 
significant effects on different countries and communities’ experiences.  
 
In this briefing, we use personal stories and testimonies that we are collecting across the 
country as a starting point to highlight particular social, economic and political factors that 
we deem relevant for understanding the on-going COVID19 outbreak in Italy. This is with a 
view to identifying challenges and opportunities that should be taken into consideration by 
national and international response interventions. We complemented these with media 
monitoring and background research. The framing is based on cumulative social science 
evidence from previous epidemics across the world, and the authors’ experience working in 
and studying emergencies like the West African Ebola response. 
 
The briefing has three aims: 
 
- To bear witness to the situation in Italy and individual experiences, keeping a record 
of how the epidemic and associated responses are affecting the health system; social, 
economic, and political relations; as well as individual lives.  
- To support an understanding of the current situation that takes into account Italy’s 
particular socio-political context. 
- To identify recommendations for interventions aimed at responding to the outbreak 
and to mitigate its social costs. 
 
This document will continue to be updated as we receive further testimonies and as the 
emergency develops. We hope that Italy’s experience will also provide lessons for outbreak 
response efforts in other countries around the world. 
 
Summary of Main Points 
• The Italian health-care system is rapidly becoming overwhelmed and whilst the focus has 
been on the North, migration to the South following the announcement of a lockdown has 
brought the outbreak to regions with less well-resourced health systems 
• Health-care workers (HCWs) across the country are over stretched, lack essential equipment, 
ICU beds and face increasingly critical shortages of protective masks. There is widespread 
concern regarding staff shortages as key personnel gets ill or enters quarantine 
• At-risk groups do not only include those with pre-existing health conditions and the elderly. 
For example, people living in low-income neighbourhoods, those in overcrowded migrant 
centres, prisons, and in abusive relationships face specific challenges in relation to the 
outbreak and its response, for example due to the obstacles to and implications of self-
isolation. 
• The Italian government has passed significant economic measures to support workers during 
the emergency, including extraordinary efforts to support precarious workers and freelancers. 
Factory workers, migrant and irregular workers however continue to face particular risk. 
• E-learning options have allowed for education to continue, but there are challenges in the 
availability of material and the inclusion of marginalised children (e.g. migrants) 
• Health-care workers, as well as many citizens in isolation and those who already experienced 
less extreme forms of isolation prior to the outbreak, are reporting serious mental health 
challenges. These will likely have serious long-term consequences. 
• Latent social conflicts have in some cases resulted in violence, for example in recent prison 
riots, attacks on migrants and foreigners, and sporadic attacks in some A&E units. 
• Communication has at times been confusing and contradictory, especially at the start of the 
epidemic, damaging trust in the response in a context where trust in institutions is already 
low. 
• Strong community-led mobilisation and government efforts have been significant in 
strengthening national solidarity and cohesion. 
 
Key Recommendations 
1. Develop coherent and coordinated communication and targeted community engagement 
strategies. 
2. Expand understanding of who is “at risk” and develop specific guidance for all vulnerable 
groups, including alternative self-isolation options. 
3. Continue developing support for different categories of workers, including considerations for 
those in the informal economy. 
4. Deliver psycho-social support to those in self-isolation, in at-risk groups, and for health-care 
workers. 
5. Consider deploying regional or municipal task forces with several pillars to include a wider 
range of competences. 
6. Continue monitoring changing socio-economic dimensions of the outbreak. 






2. Effects of COVID-19 on the Health System 
 
21. Regional Considerations 
 
The rapid onset of the Novel Coronavirus (COVID19) epidemic in Italy followed a delay in 
recognising and detecting the spread of the virus in January 2020. This allowed the contagion 
to progress unchecked for weeks and to grow exponentially in the Lombardia region of Italy. 
As work-related movements are frequent, the disease was quick to spread to all other regions 
too within a matter of weeks. 
 
However, while Lombardia, and more in general the North of Italy, has a well-resourced 
health system and one among the best in the world, the same cannot be said of the rest of the 
country. Italy has in fact for decades experienced divided dual-speed growth with the 
industrialised high-income areas in the North scoring far ahead in terms of living conditions 
than the impoverished South. Migration from southern to northern regions also adds to the 
drain of human capital. 
 
Against this background, the potential for sustained contagion in the rest of the country is 
particularly worrying, given that even the well-resourced Lombardia health system is 
buckling under the pressure of exponentially growing new cases needing hospitalisation and 
in particular admission to intensive care units (ICUs). Yet, to date, most of the media 
attention has focused on northern Italy – understandably as that is where the bulk of cases 
and deaths has been recorded. However, concerns about the spread of COVID19 to less well-
resourced parts of Italy have increased following the initial announcement on 8th of March to 
enforce a lock-down in Lombardia and some surrounding areas. This prompted the 
controversial decision by scores of residents to board trains and buses, literally overnight, to 
leave the areas, directed towards the South. These are mostly people from the South, who 
live, study and work in the North. Not surprisingly, many of them had knowingly or 
unknowingly been infected at the time of travelling, which translated into higher numbers of 
cases in the Southern regions targeted by the reverse migration influx. As a family doctor 
from Naples, in Campania region, explained: 
 
“we saw a spike of new cases in correspondence with the descent of these 
‘barbarians’. I have not had cases to refer myself, but from the Whatsapp group chat 
of all doctors in my district, I could see that many were reporting new suspected cases 
of people who had recently returned from up North. Not all could be traced and 
quarantined as some hid themselves, they did not want to comply with mandatory 
quarantine measures. For example, once a man from Reggio Emilia came to my 
practice asking for advice; my secretary who received him asked him to wait in the 
waiting area as he had to inform me of the visit. By the time, I went out to meet him, 
he had left without warning. It is clear that if he was presenting symptoms, he went on 
to infect others”. 
 
Other regions in Italy also recorded increases in case associated with returnees from the 
North. Currently the incubation period of COVID19 is thought to be up to 14 days (WHO 
2020), so the full scale of such reverse migration impact should soon be clear. Local 
institutions fear that over the following weeks, cases could rapidly multiply. 
 
 
Under-resourced hospitals and Health-Care Workers 
 
The infection from Covid-19 has relatively long recovery times, currently estimated to be 
between 15 and 20 days on average. This means that beds are not freeing up at pace with new 
severe case numbers. When summing private and public capacity for intensive care therapy, 
Lombardia has over 600 spaces, which have rapidly almost filled up entirely as of mid-March 
2020. Other regions in Italy have only a fraction of those spaces, particularly in the South of 
the country. In spite of the recent efforts to convert facilities and expand ICUs capacity, the 
risk is that, if the spread of the disease reaches similar proportions, entire regions will be 
completely unable to provide ventilation, resuscitation, and on-going care for critical 
COVID19 patients, so the health crisis could rapidly aggravate. Such possibility is all but 
remote considering a number of concomitant risk factors, and indeed it has already given rise 
to controversies around the eventual necessity of triage to prioritise intensive care for 
younger patients or those more likely to recover from the disease. According to a number of 
reports, such difficult decisions already had to be implemented in the most affected areas of 
the North. 
 
Analysis from Matteo Villa of ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale), using 
Civil Protection data,  in the graph below shows the current ratio of COVID19 patients in 
ICUs against maximum capacity as of the 14th of March. It is clear that the Lombardia and 






A coroner from Lombardia pointed to the fact that the suspension of funerals as part of the 
ordinances has meant that morgues are struggling. Autopsies have been reduced to twice a 
week in the Milan area for lack of equipment such as gloves and coats. In the province of 
Bergamo, a particularly affected area, the recent death of a mayor was accompanied by the 
distressing news that burials in Val Seriana were happening “every half hour”.  
 
Another risk factor is associated with the availability of health-care workers and their 
protection. Alarmingly, we have received reports of scarcity, or outright lack, of protective 
equipment for the first tier of health-care workers, that is family doctors, in under-resourced 
Southern regions. As family doctors are considered self-employed professionals, there has 
been a delay, or some say unwillingness, to step up the provision of personal protective 
equipment such as goggles, face masks, and gloves. Unfortunately, supplies in shops and 
pharmacies very rapidly depleted, which means that family doctors have been carrying out 
their duties for weeks now, without any adequate protection. Their concerns have heightened 
following growing evidence of asymptomatic transmission, especially as most health-care 
workers were initially only encouraged to wear a mask when coming in contact with 
symptomatic patients.  
 
While a system of telephone-based triage was rapidly phased in, it took time before visits to 
practices diminished. In the words of a family doctor in Naples: 
 
“I had to scare them to convince them to stop coming to the practice in person. But it is 
important that I protect myself too as we have been given nothing by the regional 
government. And when you try and purchase masks and gloves yourself, it also is impossible 
because stock has virtually run out everywhere. I am lucky to have received two surgical 
masks, mind you not even the proper type, from a pharmacy where my patients normally go 
for their prescriptions; but that is just because the pharmacy wanted to show me solidarity 
and appreciation as I provide their clients”. 
 
Another family doctor from Reggio Calabria also explained: 
 
“We have received an official communication yesterday (10th March), telling us to go and 
collect our protective equipment, but up to now we have had to work without; even though I 
had some myself as I also work in hospitals. But it really does depend on individual doctors.” 
 
On the 16th of March, doctors in Naples and Reggio Calabria alerted us of critical shortages 
on protective masks, as they expected their supply to finish within two days with no clarity 
on when they would be able to access more.  
 
Even for hospitals, where equipment was made more readily available, issues with staff 
numbers are increasingly arising. Nurses and doctors are working long shifts, abandoning 
their annual leave, and even then shortages are common. In addition, unprotected contacts 
with infected patients can lead to further shortages as personnel need to enter a quarantine 
period. In relation to this, controversy was sparked by the government’s decision on the 9th of 
March, which asked all health-care staff to resume their duties immediately if they did not 
display symptoms, even if they had had contacts with potentially infected patients. The 
decree that mandated such new duties was meant to stem the loss of further precious 
personnel resources. At the same time, this created protests among family and hospital 
doctors and nurses given that it has the potential to fuel contagion even further; leaving aside 
the risk it creates to health-care personnel who are constantly exposed to infectious patients. 
To date, dozens of health-care staff have been infected and unfortunately various deaths have 
also been reported. In addition, asymptomatic health-care staff can transmit the disease to 
patients they come into contact with, risking to rapidly transforming hospitals into clusters of 
nosocomial transmission. In this respect, the WHO has recently changed its guidelines to 
encourage countries to step up its testing efforts in an attempt to stem transmission by 
targeting asymptomatic cases. In addition, several petitions are circulating in a number of 
European countries, such as Italy and the UK, to request that all health-care staff is tested 
regardless of their symptoms. 	
It is, therefore, clear that shortages of both personnel, protective equipment, intensive care 
infrastructure, and testing kits and resources are major obstacles at the moment and that the 
response to the crisis could be severely affected by them. 
 
Co-morbidity and Effect on non-COVID Health Services 
 
Outbreaks inevitably have both direct and indirect effects on uptake and availability of other 
health services, with case counts often obscuring the broader effects on those suffering from 
other diseases. Regions across Italy have been suspending all non-urgent hospital admissions, 
only guaranteeing the service of haemato-oncologic patients and other cardiac emergencies. 
All planned procedures and A&E clinics of non-urgent nature have been suspended to free up 
resources for the COVID19 emergency. Other sectors, including psychiatry departments for 
example, have suffered significant repercussions. In the worst hit regions, many departments 
were converted to COVID units and follow-up appointments with psychiatric patients had to 
be reduced or moved online.  
 
 
Another main concern beyond the epidemic of COVID19 per se is co-morbidity. Italy has an 
ageing population, indeed 22% of the population are over 65. This makes the threat from co-
morbidities particularly serious for a number of reasons. Firstly, elderly patients and those 
with pre-existing respiratory or cardiac conditions, or chronic conditions such as diabetes, are 
at higher risk of developing complications from the virus; we know that such conditions are 
relatively more present among the elderly population. In addition, more generally, an elderly 
population presents more medical conditions on all fronts. The elderly are therefore more 
likely to suffer both directly and indirectly from the epidemic. But younger individuals may 
also suffer if bed capacity gets filled up so quickly that those suffering serious respiratory 
complications from COVID19 infection are unable to access emergency treatment in ICUs.  
 
An additional element to consider is that medical conditions, especially those of chronic 
nature, may be more prevalent among the low-income sections of the population given their 
impaired or diminished access to adequate health. This, combined with the living and 
working conditions that do not allow for effective social distancing, as described below, 
make this part of the population particularly vulnerable. Additional resources and layouts are 
urgently needed to provide safety nets to all these vulnerable sections of the population, to 
avoid catastrophic short and long-term impacts. 
 
Poverty and Living conditions 
 
As mentioned in the previous section,  there are particular segments of the population that are 
especially vulnerable and require particular attention. A story from Naples is particularly 
indicative. On 8th March, Luca Franzese – an actor in the internationally acclaimed TV 
Series Gomorrah -took to the media to report his 47-year-old epileptic sister’s death as a 
consequence of Covid-19 infection. A video circulated widely on social media showing 
Teresa’s body abandoned in their family house for over 24 hours awaiting confirmation of a 
Coronavirus diagnosis. Teresa Franzese reportedly caught the disease from a friend and 
neighbour who lived with family members also suffering from the disease. No one had 
received a formal diagnosis up until the unexpected death of the 47-year-old woman, nor had 
they sought one prior to that; in spite of a relentless media campaign to sensitise people. 
 
Living conditions in the area of Naples where Teresa lived with her family make it almost 
impossible for social distancing and containment measures mandated by central and regional 
governments to work. Eight members of Luca and Teresa’s family were in the house while 
the woman’s body awaited collection by a specialised team.  The whole area is host to mostly 
low-income households and has very high population density levels, with the poorest often 
co-habiting in a one-room open space. Up to eight people can be found living in such 
basement or ground floor dwellings, known as “bassi”. In these places, self-isolation is 
simply not possible.  
 
A similar concern is being raised in relation to migrant centres. Italy has a significant migrant 
population and the social tensions around migration have been well documented. When 
migrants first arrive to Italy there are a number of different centres that they can go through: 
starting at first aid centres then moving to centres where they can apply for asylum and in 
some cases in detention centres.  The centres can be overcrowded, for example volunteers 
with experience in Rome’s “centri di accoglienza” (migrant centres) told us that there are up 
to six people to a room and in some cases migrants are not allowed to cook their own food, 
waiting for it to be shipped in. This could be particularly problematic if those channels are cut 
off and in the event of a need to put people in individual or collective quarantine. This is 
already no longer a hypothetical concern, as on the 16th March the first COVID19 case was 
recorded in a migrant centre in Milan. Prisons, furthermore, are known to be at high risk of 
contagion, and as discussed below this has resulted in tensions and escalated to riots in some 
of the country’s prisons. 
 
4. Work, Education and The Economy 
 
The effects of COVID19 on the global economy and on the Italian economy in particular are 
inevitably significant, but the full effects cannot yet be estimated. On the 6th of March, 
Moody’s revised its predictions for growth in the coming year to -0.5% or -0.7% in case of a 
longer impact of the COVID19 emergency (ANSA 2020).  
 
There are on-going debates about whether productive activities can go on during this kind of 
emergency, with the government encouraging factories not to close down but to ensure the 
health of their workers. The CEO of Leonardo, the country’s top manufacturing firm in the 
aerospace, defence and security sectors, for example said in a newspaper interview: “health 
comes first but Leonardo cannot stop”. A number of initiatives are being put in place to make 
it possible to continue working whilst complying with the new ordinances. Public and private 
employers have made efforts to facilitate working from home, and a government-led “digital 
solidarity” initiative is making available online collaborative working platforms (known in 
Italian as ‘smart working’). However, the current emergency is exposing significant 
differences between the ability to protect blue collar and white-collar workers. As the 
coordinator of a private sector consortium in the North noted: “those who work on the factory 
floor can’t do ‘smart work’”. In some cases, these tensions have resulted in strikes and 
contestations in those factories that have remained open. La Repubblica reported the protest 
of factory workers in Brescia who said: ‘non siamo carne da macello’ (we are not meat for 
slaughter). Giuseppe Civati, the leader of the opposition party Possibile, highlighted that this 
is particularly troubling for people who work illegally in these factories and have no formal 
protection. On the 14th of March, following consultations with trade unions, the government 
published a protocol that outlines measures to protect workers, including ensuring that they 
are provided with protective equipment, in an attempt to encourage companies to stay open 
and limit economic damages. The ability and willingness of different companies to comply 
with these measures remains to be seen, and Possibile continue to receive complaints from 
workers who say they are not being protected and who express concern about being asked to 
keep working.  
 
Larger companies that rely on international investments and therefore have more stringent 
regulations have been quicker to respond, as they activated already well-developed 
preparedness plans. However, Italy’s industrial structure is such that the majority of the 
private sector is made of small and medium size businesses. Many of these businesses have 
had to react quickly and develop their own internal policies to protect workers and to be in 
line with government decrees. A businessman from Varese told us that they allowed all of 
their employees to stay home, but, for those who have to come in, they have asked them to 
try to have only one person per office, to wear masks if they come into contact with others, 
while all communal areas were closed. Some factories across the North have established 
fixed working groups of approximately six workers, with staggered entry, while others are 
purchasing individual insurance for their workers. 
 
Certain sectors and social groups are more likely to experience a disproportionately high 
economic cost of social distancing and other response measures and need to be particularly 
protected. Italy’s entertainment and tourism sectors have unsurprisingly taken a significant 
hit. Owners of bars and restaurants, who “live by the cashier”, risk immediate bankruptcy.  
As in other parts of Europe, precarious work has risen steadily in Italy in the last thirty years. 
A number of laws (e.g. the Biagi Law in 2003) increased flexibility in the labour market but 
with the consequence of also increasing precarious working conditions, especially for 
younger generations. These workers along with freelancers (‘partita IVA’) are a particularly 
at-risk group. 
 
For example: M. from a Northern town teaches in a gym and her boyfriend owns a bar, both 
had to shut leaving them with no income. As the lockdown was announced they had no 
information from the government regarding possible support for their specific situation. L. a 
30 year old who also teaches yoga said that:  
 
“Without any clear provision from the government I tried to keep working until the last 
minute, also taking some risks, but once the decree came in I had to stop and close my 
business. This means not only that I am giving up any form of income, but I also have 
to keep paying to rent the place where I teach. If this goes on for much longer, I am not 
sure how I will keep going, I hope the government will put something in place”. 
 
In the week of 15th March, there have been a series of wide-ranging and 
unprecedentedgovernment measures to alleviate the economic effects of the outbreak. This 
includes offering sick pay for people in quarantine, suspension of taxes and mortgages, 
reduction of utility bills for the whole of 2020 and a possible transfer of 600 euros to people 
working independently which would go some way to addressing the particular challenges 
faced by freelancers.  	
A significant proportion of people work in the informal or ‘unobserved’ economy (‘in nero’), 
including, as discussed below, carers and migrant workers. Italy’s main statistics agency 
(ISTAT) calculated in 2016 that the ‘unobserved economy’ amounted for around 12.4% of 
GDP. It will be important to continue monitoring changes in these economies, to consider 
alternative avenues for supporting those who are severely affected but ‘off the books’ as well 
as precarious workers, freelancers and small business owners. 	
With regards to the education sector, the closure of schools and universities was one of the 
first measures to be adopted, first by particularly hard hit regions then by the whole country.  
 
Schools across the country have been developing distance learning efforts, including through 
the Classroom Google app. Aside from the significant challenges for parents who are either 
working from home or are still required to work, there are also significant technical 
challenges with e-learning infrastructure. One teacher from a Northern town said that she was 
having to spend 8 hours a day on the phone to give technical support to students. As a 
consequence, most teachers are resorting to sharing homework on WhatsApp. University 
students are also struggling to access the books they need and graduations and Viva-voce 
examinations will be delayed.  
 
Significantly, migrant students are bearing the highest costs. Those who arrived recently to 
Italy have not been uniformly added onto the e-learning platforms and struggle with language 
barriers. Some teachers are volunteering to do Italian lessons with them separately on the 
phone. However, in migrant centres, language teachers and cultural mediators have had to 
suspend all activities. S. for example was worried about whether she would be entitled to paid 
leave whilst also expressing concern about how to deal with the ‘social tensions’ that were 
emerging within the centres. They were planning online classes but were receiving little 
support.  
 
5. Psychosocial impact on HCWs and quarantined isolated people  
 
The immediate and long-term psychosocial impact of epidemics is well documented from 
previous outbreaks (Kingori and McGowan 2016; Van Bortel et al. 2016; Robertson et al. 
2004). The focus is often, and rightly so, on the experience of health-care workers who 
during emergencies tend to be overwhelmed with work, taking significant risks and in some 
cases also stigmatised in their communities for fears that they are carrying the disease. The 
kinds of challenges faced by the Italian health sector as described above, will inevitably have 
significant repercussions. In recent days, media reports have also been emerging of doctors 
expressing their anguish in having to isolate themselves from their loved ones, in an attempt 
to keep them safe. 
 
It is also, however, important to consider the mental health effects on individuals and families 
in lockdown, quarantine, and self-isolation as well as that of survivors and the families of 
those who are sick. A., a university student, and her sister for example spoke of feeling 
aimless, “inept” and “unable to react”. There is also significant anxiety related to elderly 
relatives. One of our interlocutors in her 70s lived on her own following the death of her 
husband last year, she was worried about going out for shopping as she had no mask or 
sanitiser and relied on a shop-owner bringing some food to her house every couple of days. 
She felt “scared and isolated most of the time”. F. from Rome instead explained how she 
struggled with her 80 year old father’s unwillingness to self-isolate because he said: “we are 
in the hands of God, I don’t want to just survive, I want to live”. 
 
6. Social Care  
As mentioned above, Italy has an ageing population among the largest in the world. This is 
having immediate effects on the experience of the epidemic in the country, as the elderly are 
an at-risk group. In addition, the role of family-based care of the elderly in Italy has 
significant implications for the set of measures most appropriate to protect the vulnerable and 
the specific design of social distancing measures. Italy’s welfare system is “characterised by 
its familialistic orientation”, and, in relation to elderly care, family members take the primary 
role and are the main recipient of welfare support (Mazzola et al. 2016). The elderly either 
live at home with younger relatives or rely on their regular visits to get support with buying 
food and other necessities. This familialistic welfare system also means that grandparents are 
often the primary providers of childcare. In addition, “a large number of families privately 
[employ] eldercare assistants” known as badanti (ibid). These are often migrant workers with 
irregular contracts. Such arrangements have consequences for transmission dynamics. Three 
points are especially crucial. Firstly, the protection of the elderly is particularly challenging 
and requires specific guidance for families to assist them in providing care relatives. 
Secondly, the effects of school closures on the protection of elderly people who provide 
childcare need to be addressed. Thirdly, the protection of irregular migrant workers in this 
sector, as noted above, though difficult from the government’s perspective, needs to be given 
further consideration. 
 
7. Trust, Communication and Social Conflict 
 
In recent epidemics, including the Ebola outbreaks in West Africa, challenges in the 
implementation of outbreak response measures have highlighted the central role of trust. Our 
research in Sierra Leone for example has shown that a history of eroded trust in institutions 
and external intervention set the stage for suspicion of the Ebola response, the spread of 
rumours about the epidemic and, in some instances, rejection of containment measures (Enria 
2015; Enria et al. 2016; see also Wilkinson and Leach 2015; Benton and Dionne 2015).  
 
In Italy, trust in institutions has historically been low. A Eurobarometer survey in 2018 
showed for example that 66% of the population tended not to trust the government. Volatile 
governments, regular corruption accusations and significant political divisions have 
contributed to this in recent years. Whilst an analysis of the current political situation in Italy 
is beyond the scope of this briefing, it is worth noting that the current government is a 
coalition between the Democratic Party (PD) and the Five Star Movement (M5S), a party that 
initially emerged in explicit contestation of what they perceived as a corrupt political elite. 
The M5S itself has however not been able to avoid corruption scandals since it initially 
entered Parliament in 2016 in coalition with the far-right Lega (their coalition broke down in 
August 2019).  
 
A context of mistrust is relevant for understanding initial concerns around compliance with 
government regulations. In the first weeks of the emergency, there were for example reports 
of people escaping quarantines from Northern lock-down areas. Rumours also circulated 
widely on traditional and social media that mischaracterised and underplayed the epidemic 
comparing it any other ordinary flu; or, in other cases, spread false information leading to 
panic. In other areas in the South of Italy, many did not buy into alarming messages 
regarding a new epidemic originating in China and affecting the distant and rich northern part 
of the country, and were initially reluctant to receive and comply with official advice on 
prevention. 
 
To counteract these risks, many especially among the wealthier classes, repeatedly asked for 
the army to intervene in order to force everyone into quarantine. They worried about the 
broader consequences resulting from the reluctance to comply with regulations on the part of 
the youth and all those who lacked adequate information or sense of community belonging. 
However, a militarised response in the context of Italy raises a series of concerns especially 
in Southern regions where structural violence is associated with the long-standing presence of 
organised crime. Territorial ties with organised crime are typically associated with both 
strained relationships with authorities and low sense of belonging to any national identity. 
This results in low levels of compliance with government-mandated provisions, mostly 
because the State is often absent from the socio-economic relations of people living in areas 
where the presence of organised crime is rife. Naturally, a sudden pervasive intervention such 
as a territorial lock-down is unlikely to elicit spontaneous compliance in these circumstances. 
Were the government to choose a militarised response, there could be a number of negative 
consequences. As has been documented, militarisation strains state-society relations in an 
already tense context of emergency (Enria 2019; Benton 2017). The forceful containment of 
certain sections of the population can have longer-term repercussions for civil rights and 
social cohesion. At worst, the presence of the military in certain regions where violence and 
mistrust are already high and structural as some parts of the South and areas with sginificant 
organised crime presence, would risk an escalation of violence. This would add civil strife to 
a health crisis. 
 
A significant challenge for building trust in the national response has been around the 
perception of confused, or even contradictory, communication, at least in the first weeks of 
the epidemic. This is both in terms of “vertical” communication between different tiers of the 
institutional hierarchy and external communication from the government to the public. For 
example, there have been on-going tensions around COVID19 testing where local health 
centres (ASL: Azienda Sanitaria Locale) were receiving contradictory protocols around 
whether to do ‘blanket testing’ or test only those who were symptomatic, so they were not 
sure which protocols to follow. Disagreements continue in this regard, paralleling 
international debates about appropriate testing measures.  In Italy these have played out quite 
publicly (e.g. on social media debates between public health specialists) in ways that may 
result confusing and counterproductive for the public. A second example of communication 
problems that had a negative effect on the outbreak response was a leak of the ordinance 
relating to the lock-down of a number of Northern regions. The decree was published in full 
in a major national newspaper before the government announced it, contributing to tens of 
thousands of people escaping to return to the South, as previously described, and potentially 
contributing to a further spread of the disease in Southern regions.  
 
Some of our testimonies focus on the perception of contradictions in the ordinances (for 
example on-going debates on social media on whether it is possible to go for a walk or not) 
and a wish for more accountability and meaningful engagement with citizens when 
communicating facts around the epidemic. This was not necessarily in terms of a lack of 
information but rather due to “too much information”, with TV talk shows, newspapers and 
social media rife with debates and disagreements between different kinds of experts and non-
experts but a dearth of explanation about the decisions behind specific response measures. 
For some, daily press conferences that simply report case and death numbers give a sense of 
lack of accountability and that the government has given up after imposing the lockdown.   
 
Other information campaigns and social mobilisation efforts have had more success. These 
include for example the sharing of guidance on hand washing and symptoms through 
accessible FAQs, the establishment of the viral hashtag #iorestoacasa (‘I am staying home’), 
the use of megaphones to encourage people within neighbourhoods to stay home, the 
engagement of celebrities in the sharing of public health messaging and community-led 
musical ‘flash-mobs’ from people’s windows and balconies to strengthen a sense of national 
solidarity during the lock-down.  
 
Questions of trust and social cohesion must also take into account the potential for latent and 
emerging social conflicts. Migration for example has been a particularly contentious topic in 
Italy in recent years, in particular under the Lega-M5S government that presided over the 
criminalisation of any support to migrants and the blocking of migrant boats in the 
Mediterranean. Especially in the early days of the epidemic, cases of violent attacks against 
migrants, and particularly those of Chinese origins, were reported. Other episodes of violence 
have been recorded throughout Italy with serial revolts in several national prisons, sparked by 
the ban on visits as part of the ordinance on social distancing measures. Violence was also 
reportedly sparked by inmates’ fear of contagion in a setting where they worried they would 
not be cared for; chiefly due to the endemic overcrowding and under-resourcing of Italian 
prisons. The media have also reported a number of instances of violence against health-care 
staff in Campania, where generalised panic and frustration translated into attacks at the triage 
point of care or in A&Es departments. Finally, national women’s groups are highlighting the 
need to protect women from domestic abuse during the lock-down. This is of particular 
concern in Italy where women’s groups have been campaigning for legislative change to 
address the country’s high rates of ‘femicides’ and domestic abuse, for the most part 





1. Equipment and protection of HCWs 
The most immediate need is support for the health system across Italy. As regions like 
Lombardia edge closer to collapse and the outbreak spreads across the country, it is vital that 
all regions are prepared. This includes support in terms of personnel, ICUs machinery and 
essential protective equipment for health-care staff. The Chinese and Cuban governments 
already took some steps in this direction, agreeing to provide supplies of personal protective 
equipment. MSF has also urged European Members States to “demonstrate solidarity beyond 
their national borders” in a collective effort to protect health workers. 
 
 
2. Regional Task Forces, Expanded Pillars and International Support 
 
The organisational element of the institutional response to the outbreak should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, it is likely that the effectiveness of the response is affected by the 
type of stakeholders sitting at the table when the response is devised. More specifically, task 
forces should be inspired by an extended pillars principle and include competencies from 
different sectors of society; beyond political representatives. Of course, the presence of 
scientific and medical professionals is key, but that of local communities representatives, 
psychotherapeutic professionals, cultural mediators, communication experts, and social 
scientists is also crucial. 
Finally, given the shortages highlighted above, it has become clear that national capacity is at 
the moment limited and strained. There is urgent need for an expanded international response 
to support national efforts, both from the physical and human capital point of view. 
 
3. Protecting At-Risk Groups 
In the context of the current emergency, it will be important to expand our understanding of 
“at-risk groups” and to consider context-specific transmission dynamics. We therefore 
suggest that specific guidance is provided for example on: 
 - How to continue family care of the elderly whilst keeping them safe - Alternative self-isolation arrangements for those living in overcrowded 
accommodation, prisons and migrant centres. These arrangements need to take into 
account the psycho-social needs of individuals and communities and could learn 
lessons and adapt models from Community Care Centres established in previous 
epidemics. - How to protect women, children and others from domestic abuse during lockdowns 
and quarantines 
 
4. Support for workers 
The government’s announced economic measures show extraordinary commitment to support 
workers and to react to specific challenges including those faced by freelance workers. It will 
be essential to continue the national dialogue about how on-going industrial activities affect 
factory workers, especially in sectors with fewer protections. It will also remain important to 
monitor economic effects on vulnerable categories as the emergency develops and to 
consider how to protect groups that may fall through the cracks, such as those working in the 
informal economy. 
 
5. Psychosocial Interventions 
 
The psychological and social toll of this emergency will need to be monitored as the outbreak 
continues, as protracted isolation is likely to have long-term repercussions. We also need to 
continue gathering information on the psycho-social needs of health-care workers. WHO 
recommendations on psychosocial considerations during outbreaks, and for COVID19 in 
particular, need to be effectively integrated as a standalone pillar in national responses and 
supported by international partners intervening in Italy.  
 
6. Communication and Community Engagement 
 
Prior epidemics have shown the importance of clear and coherent community engagement 
and risk communication in supporting campaigns to increase the acceptability of outbreak 
responses. Learning lessons from previous epidemics suggests that: 
 - Communication must be context specific, that is, it needs to reflect local concerns and 
understanding. In Italy this might also mean considering developing regionally 
specific communication campaigns to divulge nationally coordinated campaigns in 
ways that are locally relevant. - Communication efforts should continue to identify and make use of different forms of 
communications including social media.  - Response task forces should consult latest guidance on meaningful community 
engagement and develop initiatives relevant to the Italian context to encourage 
participation at national and local level. - Engaging communities effectively requires valuing local leadership and using 
different channels to communicate and encourage two-way dialogues. This means 
identifying social networks that are trusted and have wide reach, for example local 
social movements, football associations or parent groups.  - Identifying latent or explicit social conflicts and marginalised groups to develop 
targeted messaging and dialogue to avoid tension and protect the vulnerable (e.g. 
disseminating domestic abuse hotlines, sensitisation around discrimination against 
migrants, care for the elderly etc). 
 
 
7. Continued monitoring of social dimensions of the emergency 
 
The situation will continue to change rapidly with different effects on Italy’s social, political 
and economic life and varied repercussions for different groups of people. We recommend 
continued analysis of these dynamics to closely support the development of tailored 
communication other outbreak response measures. 
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